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Santana v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 121 (Dec. 28, 2006)1
 
CRIMINAL LAW - COERCION 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a conviction in the Eighth Judicial District Court of 19 counts of coercion 
resulting in five consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole and fourteen 
concurrently running life sentences.  Appellant argues that the jury instructions did not instruct 
the jury to apply the reasonable person test and therefore seeks a new trial. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Reversed and remanded.  The Nevada Supreme Court, extending their holding in Deshler 
v. State,2 held that because the district court did not instruct the jury to apply the reasonable 
person test, the defendant did not receive a fair trial. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 While Vincent Mark Santana (Santana), appellant, was incarcerated at the Clark County 
Detention Center he used the Detention Center’s telephone to make several random phone calls 
to a variety of women and children in California.  Each phone call began with a pre-recorded 
message notifying that the call was collect and that the call was coming from the Clark County 
Detention Center.   
 Once the woman or child accepted the call, Santana told the victims that the pre-recorded 
message was not real.  After some congenial conversation, Santana told each person that he was 
nearby with a weapon.  Santana then commanded each victim to participate in a sexual 
conversation or he would harm her.   
 Eventually the State filed 19 counts of coercion against Santana.  Many of the victims 
testified at trial.  The jury found Santana guilty of 19 counts of coercion and sentenced Santana 
to five consecutive life terms without parole and fourteen life sentences to run concurrently. 
 Santana appealed arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous because the 
instructions did not inform the jury as to what viewpoint to analyze coercion under NRS 
207.190.3  Santana argues that this error harmed his case.    
 
Discussion 
 
 First, the Nevada Supreme Court must determine the appropriate viewpoint for analysis.  
Second, the Court must determine whether the failure to explain the appropriate viewpoint to the 
jury was harmless.   
 
 
                                                 
1 By Robert Stephens 
2 106 Nev. 253 (1990). 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.190 (2005). 
Viewpoint 
 
NRS 207.190 separates coercion into felonies and misdemeanors.  A defendant is guilty 
of felony coercion when the defendant uses or threatens to use immediate physical force “to 
compel another to do or abstain from doing an act which the other person has a right to do or 
abstain from doing.”4  Coercion is a misdemeanor when the threats are future oriented.   Santana 
argues that under Deshler, when the defendant cannot immediately execute his threats then the 
defendant must have intended for future harm, if any harm at all. 
 In Deshler, the police, responding to a bar fight, found Deshler in need of medical 
treatment.5  Deshler fought with the police and paramedics when they tried to help him.6  The 
officers eventually loaded Deshler into the ambulance and Deputy Crawford (Crawford) rode 
with him to the hospital.7  While riding to the hospital, Deshler threatened Crawford and his 
family several times with lethal harm.8  Although strapped to a gurney, Deshler managed to free 
himself of the leg restraints, which required Crawford to physical hold Deshler down.9          
 The Nevada Supreme Court in Deshler determined that because there was no real 
immediate threat the reasonable person could only believe that Deshler intended future harm and 
therefore could only be guilty of a misdemeanor.10  However, the Court never stated which 
viewpoint the jury should apply in determining a defendant’s guilt for coercion.  The Court now 
extends Deshler to require juries to analyze coercion applying the reasonable person test. 
 
Harmlessness of Error 
 
 Because the immediacy of the threat distinguishes felony and misdemeanor coercion, the 
viewpoint that the jury utilized to determine the defendant’s guilt is crucial.  With an objective 
viewpoint, the jury would decide how a reasonable person would perceive the immediacy of the 
threats, whereas under a subjective viewpoint the jury would decide based on how the victims 
perceived the immediacy of the threats.  It is unclear which standard the jury applied and 
therefore the error might have changed the outcome of the case.    
    
Conclusion 
  
 The Nevada Supreme Court extended Deshler to conclude that the appropriate standard 
for juries to determine the immediacy of threats involving coercion is the reasonable person 
standard.  Further, it is uncertain whether the jury would have found Santana guilty if they 
applied the reasonable person standard and therefore the error to instruct the jury to apply the 
reasonable person test in coercion cases is a harmful error.  Reversed and remanded 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 Deshler, 106 Nev. at 254. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 255. 
10 Id. at 256. 
Justice Rose’s Concurrence 
 
 This Court should diligently review excessive criminal sentences, rather than habitually 
dismissing the reviews unless it “shock[s] the conscience.”11  Simply because the sentence is 
within the statutory limit does not necessarily mean that the sentence is not excessive. 
                                                 
11 Allred v. State, 120 Nev. 410, 420 (2004).  See also Sims v. State, 107 Nev. 438 (1991) (Rose, J., dissenting). 
